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Abstract
A sociophysical model for opinion dynamics is shown to embody a
series of recent western hung national votes all set at the unexpected
and very improbable edge of a fifty-fifty score. It started with the
Bush-Gore 2000 American presidential election, followed by the 2002
Stoiber-Schro˝der, then the 2005 Schro˝der-Merkel German elections,
and finally the 2006 Prodi-Berlusconi Italian elections. In each case,
the country was facing drastic choices, the running competing parties
were advocating very different programs and millions of voters were
involved. Moreover, polls were given a substantial margin for the
predicted winner. While all these events were perceived as accidental
and isolated, our model suggests that indeed they are deterministic
and obey to one single universal phenomena associated to the effect
of contrarian behavior on the dynamics of opinion forming. The not
hung Bush-Kerry 2005 presidential election is shown to belong to the
same universal frame. To conclude, the existence of contrarians hints
at the repetition of hung elections in the near future.
Key words: Sociophysics, opinion dynamics, contrarian behavior, fifty-
fifty voting, hung elections
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1 Voting at fifty-fifty: a very rare accidental
event ?
The mere principle underlying a democratic voting is the assumption that
there always exists a majority, even down to a small margin of a few percents.
Voting at fifty-fifty sounds an impossible event both statistically and socially,
in particular when millions of voters are involved. The impossibility looks
total when simultaneously the country is facing a difficult situation with
drastic political decisions at stake, and both competing parties are advocating
radical differences in their respective programs.
One such typical case was the recent Italian general elections of April
2006, which were predicted to mark a solid victory of Prodi coalition at the
expense of the sitting coalition of Berlusconi. Exit polls did confirmed this
expectation before the actual results dismissed it by establishing a fifty-fifty
score in terms of votes. Indeed Prodi coalition won at a margin of 24 755
votes, i.e., a difference of 0.07%, out of more than 38 million votes cast [1].
Such a hung election scenario was a surprising and unexpected rare event
for a national election where the two competing coalitions had so different
political program to address a controversial assessment of the Berlusconi
ending term policy. But indeed, it happened already several times in few
western democracies starting from the year 2000 in the US with the famous
Bush-Gore stand up for the swing state of Florida. it eventually ends with
the victory in favor of Bush by an excess of 537 votes. In terms of national
votes Bush got 47.9% against 48.4% for Gore yielding a margin of 0.5% of
the total 105 417 258 votes [1].
A similar scenario occurred again and twice in Germany for the federal
elections, first in 2002 with the Stoiber-Schro˝der race, and then in 2005 with
the Schro˝der-Merkel race, In the last case Merkel CDU/CSU alliance won
35.2 % of the votes against 34.2 % for Schro˝der SPD scoring a difference of
0.92 %. The novelty from this vote with respect to the previous September
2002 one, was the fact that the SPD/Green coalition fell to reach a majority
at the parliament in term of seats. In 2002, although the CDU/CSU and
SPD both got 38.5% of the votes cast, the SPD and Green reached 50.7% in
seat percentage [1].
The 2005 Bush-Kerry American presidential elections is at odd with above
cases since Bush received a majority of 50.73 % to 48.27% for Kerry making a
2.5% margin. Nevertheless, it subscribes to the same scenario as will become
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clear latter. We claim that it was the Bin Laden videotape released the
Friday preceding the election which shifted the election vote from a hung
result. Accordingly, would the elections have taken place two weeks latter,
the Bush-Kerry race would have yield a hung election as in 2000 as seen from
the polls evolution during the campaign.
These very rare events all came as a tremendous surprise and were not
given much explanation beside being accidental. They were neither associ-
ated to a single social phenomena. At contrast, here we want to address
the question of the possible origin and connexion of above series of recent
hung elections. In particular to find out if they could be reproduced using
one single new universal feature to be included in the dynamics of opinion
forming. And subsequently to determine if indeed the hung scenario can be
the result of a deterministic mechanism.
2 Sociophysics and opinion dynamics
To address above basic questions a general frame for opinion dynamics is
given in terms of a simple sociophysical model which operates using local
interactions and iterative updates of individual opinions [2]. The model
combines rational individual choices [3] and some contrarian behavior [4].
A contrarian is someone who deliberately decides to oppose the prevailing
choice of others whatever this choice is [4, 5].
It shows that a public debate leads to the emergence of a stable majority.
The associated dynamics is monitored by one separator located at fifty-fifty
percent and two symmetric attractors featuring a stable coexistence of a clear
cut majority-minority. It is the initial majority of individual choices prior
to the campaign, which eventually wins the vote. The level of the minority
is function of the density of contrarians and the time duration of the public
debate.
However, it is found that the existence of contrarians, above some density,
reverses the whole dynamics with the sudden merging of above two attrac-
tors with the separator, which in turn results in one single attractor located
exactly at a fifty-fifty support.
Within our model of opinion dynamics a coherent and single light is thus
shed to these very rare and disconected hung election events which occurred
recently in several western democracies. They appear to be all embodied in
a single frame and produced by the unique universal feature of contrarian
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behavior. Such an explanation hints at the repetition of hung elections in
the near future.
This work contributes to the now growing field of applications of statis-
tical physics to opinion dynamics [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] as part of the wider field
of “sociophysics” [11], which studies collective social and political behaviors.
We stress that we are not aiming at an exact description of the real social
and political life, but rather, doing some crude approximations, to enlighten
essential features of an otherwise very complex and multiple phenomena.
It is worth to emphasize that in 2005, for the first time, a highly im-
probable political vote outcome was predicted using our cultural bias model
of sociophysics [12]. The prediction was made several months ahead of the
actual vote against all polls and analyses predictions. The model deals with
the dynamics of spreading of a minority opinion in public debates using a
two sate variable system [7, 13]. It applies to a large spectrum of issues
including national votes like the recent French vote, behavior changes like
smoking versus non-smoking, support or opposition to a military action like
the war in Iraq, rumors like the French hoax about September eleven [14],
and reform proposals [15].
The emergence of a stable collective opinion is found to obey a threshold
dynamic. For general issues it is the degree of heterogeneity in the distribu-
tion of common beliefs which determines the current value of the threshold
which may well vary from ten percents to ninety percents. Accordingly the
expected democratic character of a free public debate may turn onto a dicta-
torial machine to propagate the opinion of a tiny minority against the initial
opinion of the overwhelming majority [13].
3 Our model of opinion dynamics
To study the opinion dynamics of two competing choices we discriminate be-
tween two levels in the process of formation of an individual choice. The first
one is external and sums up the net result from respectively the global in-
formation available to every one, the private information some persons may
have, the individual beliefs, and the influence of mass media. The second
level is internal and concerns the dynamics of interaction driven by people
discussions. In real life although both levels are independent, active and
interpenetrated simultaneously, here to study specifically the laws govern-
ing the internal dynamics resulting from people discussions, we arbitrarily
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decoupled them without loss of generality [7, 4].
Along this scheme we consider a population of N agents prior to the
starting of the public debate. At a time t we measure the opinion distribution
which results from the external level by polling the respective support for each
of the two competing coalitions denoted A and B. From the numbers NA(t)
and NB(t) of agents having the intention to vote for each coalition we obtain
the associated individual probabilities at time t
pA,B(t) ≡ NA,B(t)
N
, (1)
with,
pA(t) + pB(t) = 1, (2)
where we assumed every agent do have an opinion with NA(t) +NB(t) = N .
From an initial configuration, we consider artificially that all external effects
are cut off at time t and then the public debate is activated with people
starting to meet and argue among themselves.
Of course, they don’t meet all the time and all together at once. These
sociopolitical gatherings are shaped by the geometry of social life within
physical spaces like offices, houses, bars, restaurants and others. This geom-
etry determines the times and the numbers of people, which meet at a given
place. Usually it is of the order of just a few. Groups may be larger but
in these cases spontaneous splitting always occurs with people discussing in
smaller subgroups. The social meeting times are distributed around daily
highlights like lunches, dinners and drinks.
To emphasize the cognitive mechanism at work in the opinion dynamics
which arises from local interactions within each social group meeting, we
use a simple local majority rule. The complicated, and yet mainly unknown
psychological process of an individual mind shift, driven by a local group
discussions, is thus implemented by a simple “one person - one argument”
principle.
No advantage is given to a coalition in terms of lobbying or organized
strategy. People only discuss in small groups with an identical individual
persuasive power. At the end of a meeting all members of a group adopt
the opinion which had the initial majority of given arguments. In case there
exists no majority, i.e. at a tie in a group of even size, each members preserves
its initial opinion.
At the first step of our modeling we restrict the social discussion meeting
of agents to groups of size three. This constraint will be released in a second
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Figure 1: Variation of the flow diagram of opinion dynamics when there
exists no contrarians (a = 1) for update groups of size 3. Arrows show the
direction of the flow driven by the public debate for any initial respective
supports.
step. Accordingly, in the first cycle of local discussions, groups of size 3 are
formed randomly. There, all participants adopt the local majority state. An
initial 2 A (B) with one B (A) ends up with 3 A (B). The resulting voting
probability intention is
pA(t+ 1) = pA(t)
3 + 3pA(t)
2pB(t), (3)
where pA(t+ 1) > pA(t) if pA(t) >
1
2
and pA(t+ 1) < pA(t) if pA(t) <
1
2
since
Eq. (3) makes the probability vote intention pA(t) to flow monotonically
toward either one of two stable point attractors located at respectively PA = 1
and PB = 0. An unstable point separator at pc =
1
2
monitors the direction
of the opinion flow. It separates the two basins of attraction associated with
the two point attractors as seen in Figure (1)
During an election campaign people go trough several successive different
local discussions. To follow the associated vote intention evolution we iterate
Eq. (3). A number of m discussion cycles gives the series pA(t + 1), pA(t +
2)...pA(t+m). For instance starting at pA(t) = 0.45 leads successively after 5
vote intention updates to the series pA(t+1) = 0.43, pA(t+2) = 0.39, pA(t+
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Figure 2: Variation of the proportion pA(t+ 1) of supporters as function of
pA(t) for groups of size 3. Arrows show the direction of the flow for an initial
support pA(t) < pc,3 =
1
2
. The flow is democratic.
3) = 0.34, pA(t + 4) = 0.26, pA(t + 5) = 0.17 with a continuous decline in A
vote intentions. The variation of pA(t + 1) as function of pA(t) is shown in
Figure (2)
Adding 3 more cycles would result in zero A vote intention with pA(t+6) =
0.08, pA(t+ 7) = 0.02 and pA(t + 8) = 0.00. Given any initial intention vote
distribution, the random local opinion update leads toward a total polar-
ization of the collective opinion. Individual and collective opinions stabilize
simultaneously along the same and unique vote intention either A or B, de-
pending on the initial support distribution. The evolution of respectively
pA = 0.48, 0.50, 0.52 as function of repeated updates is exhibited in Figure
(3)
The update cycle number to reach either one of the two stable attractors
can be evaluated from Eq. (3). It depends on the distance of the initial
densities from the unstable point attractor. An approximate analytic formula
can derived,
n ≃ 1
ln[3
2
]
ln[
1
| 2pA(t)− 1 | ] + 1.85, (4)
where last term is a fitting correction [7]. The number of cycles being an
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Figure 3: Variation of pA(t) for groups of size 3 as function of repeated
updates with three initial support pA(t) = 0.48, 0.50, 0.52. The resulting
extremism is democratic since it is along the initial majority.
integer, its value is obtained from Eq. (4) rounding to an integer. It is found
to be n always a small number as shown in Figure (4). Eq. (4) yields 8 at an
initial value pA(t) = 0.45 and 4 at pA(t) = 0.30, which are the exact values
obtained by successive iterations from Eq. (3).
However, in real life discussions, people do not change their mind at each
gathering, consequently, every one of our formal update cycle takes indeed
some time length, which in turn is equivalent to some number of days whose
exact evaluation is out the scope of the present work.
Therefore, in practical terms the required time to eventually complete
the polarization process is much larger than the campaign duration, thus
preventing to actually reach one attractor with a total opinion polarization.
From above example at pA(t) = 0.45, two cycles yield a result of 39% in favor
of A and 61% in favor of B. One additional update cycle makes 34% in favor
of A and 66% in favor of B.
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A generalization to any distribution of group sizes was achieved yielding
a very rich and complex phase diagram [7]. A unifying frame was found with
the property to incorporate all opinion dynamics model [16].
4 The contrarian effect
We can now introduce agents who may become contrarians. A contrarian is
someone who deliberately decides to oppose the prevailing choice of others
once a local group has reached the consensus driven by the majority rule.
The shift is independent of the choice itself [4]. Contrarian strategy seems
to be a growing new trend of modern democracies and was first studied in
finance [5].
It is worth to stress we are considering the contrarian behavior as a prob-
abilistic attitude. Any agent may adopt it during one update cycle beside its
regular local majority rule mechanism. Setting contrarian choices at a den-
sity a with 0 ≤ a < 1
2
, the density of A opinion given by Eq. (3) becomes,
pA(t+ 1) = (1− a)[pA(t)3 + 3pA(t)2pB(t)] + a[pB(t)3 + 3pB(t)2pA(t)], (5)
where first term corresponds to the regular update process and second term
to contrarian contribution from local groups where the local majority was in
favor of B. The upper limit constraint on the range of a comes from the defi-
nition of a contrarian, which is a behavior opposed to the majority behavior,
hence the a < 1
2
restriction. A formalization in terms of temperature was
performed in [17]. A Monte Carlo simulation did confirm the main features
of the model [18]
Using pB = 1− pA makes Eq. (5) to write
pA(t+ 1) = (1− 2a)[−2pA(t)3 + 3pA(t)2] + a, (6)
which is shown in Fig. (4) for the case a = 0.10, i.e., with 10% of contrarian
choices as compared to the pure case a = 0 without contrarians.
From Eq. (6) the effect of low-density contrarian choices is twofold. First
both pure stable point attractors from the case a = 0 are shift toward mixed
ones with a coexistence of vote intentions. As soon as a 6= 0 total polarization
is averted with for the two symmetric attractors
PA(B) =
(1− 2a)±√12a2 − 8a+ 1
2(1− 2a) , (7)
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Figure 4: Equation (4) with pA(t + 1) as function of pA(t) at a contrarian
density of respectively a = 0 and a = 0.10. In the second case the two stable
point attractors have moved from total polarization towards a coexistence of
stable mixed vote intentions with a clear cut majority-minority splitting.
which are defined only in the range 0 ≤ a ≤ 1
6
. It is also worth to notice
that PA + PB = 1. The index A(B) means a majority for A(B) with a B(A)
minority. For instance a value of a = 0.10 yields PA = 0.85 and PB = 0.15. At
PA = 0.85 there exists a stable coexistence of vote intentions at respectively
0.85% in favor of A with 0.15% for B. The reverse holds at PB = 0.15. At
contrast contrarian choices keep unchanged the unstable point separator at
1
2
whatever is the value of 0 ≤ a < 1
6
.
The second effect from contrarian choices is an increase in the number
of cycle updates in reaching the stable attractors. For instance starting as
above at pA(t) = 0.45 with a = 0.10 leads now to the series pA(t + 1) =
0.44, pA(t + 2) = 0.43, pA(t + 3) = 0.42, pA(t + 4) = 0.40, pA(t + 5) = 0.38.
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majority-minority
Figure 5: Variation of the flow diagram of opinion dynamics when contrar-
ians are included (a 6= 0) for update groups of size 3. The cases a = 0.05
and a = 0.10 are shown. Arrows show the direction of the flow driven by the
public debate for any initial respective supports.
Additional 12 updates are required to reach the stable attractor at 0.15. All
cycles score to 17 against only 8 without contrarian choices. A vote after two
update cycles from above same example would give a voting result of 43%
in favor of A and 57% in favor of B instead of respectively 39% and 61% at
a = 0.
As for the non contrarian case an approximate formula can be derived
from Eq. (6) to evaluate the update cycle number required to reach either
one of the two stable attractors. It writes,
n ≃ 1
ln[3
2
(1− 2a)] ln[
2pA − 1
| 2pA(t)− 1 | ] +
1.85
(1− 2a)5.2 , (8)
where we have used the property PA + PB = 1 and last term is a fitting cor-
rection [7]. At a = 0.10 we found the exact values of 17 and 9 for respectively
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a=0
a=0.10
Figure 6: Approximate number of cycles of vote intention updates to reach
a total polarization of opinion as function of an initial support pA(t).
pA(t) = 0.45 and pA(t) = 0.30.
Both Eq. (8) and Figure (6) show explicitly that the existence of contrar-
ian behavior has a drastic effect in increasing the number of required update
cycle to reach the stable point attractors (which exist only for a < 1
6
). That
means much more weeks in a real debate time scale. In practical terms it
implies a quasi-stable coexistence of both vote intentions not too far from
fifty percent but yet with a clear-cut majority in one direction, which is
determined by the initial majority.
However contrarian choices may lead to an additional radical qualitative
change in the whole vote intention dynamics. Eq. (7) shows that at a density
of a = 1
6
≃ 0.17, contrarian choices make both point attractors to merge
simultaneously at the unstable point separator pc =
1
2
turning it to a stable
point attractor as seen in Figure (7)
Consequences on the vote intention dynamics are drastic. The flow direc-
tion is now reversed making any initial densities of vote intentions to converge
via the public debate toward a perfect equality between vote intention for
A and B. In physical terms, contrarians produce a phase transition from an
ordered symmetry broken majority-minority phase into a disordered sym-
metrical fifty percent balance phase with no majority-minority splitting. In
the ordered phase elections always yield a clear-cut majority.
At contrast in the disordered phase elections lead to a random outcome
driven by statistical fluctuations with a result very close to fifty-fifty. An
illustration is shown in Figure (8) for 20% of contrarians.
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Democratic disabling: the hung opinion
a > 0.17
Figure 7: Hung voting fow diagram of opinion dynamics when contrarians
are included with (a > ac =
1
6
) for update groups of size 3. Arrows show that
from any initial supports the public debate drives the opinion distribution
toward 1
2
.
5 Group size increase
In real social life people dont meet only by group of 3. However, generalizing
above approach to larger sizes is straightforward and does not change the
qualitative feature of the model. Dynamics reversal driven by contrarians
towards the disorder phase with no majority-minority splitting is preserved.
The main effect is an increase in the value of the contrarian critical density
at which the phase transition occurs. In the case of an odd size k, Eq. (6)
becomes,
pA(t + 1) = (1− 2a)
k∑
i= k+1
2
C ikpA(t)
ipB(t)
(k−i) + a, (9)
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Figure 8: pA(t + 1) as function of pA(t) at a = 0 and a = 0.20. In the first
case the vote intention flows away from the unstable point attractor at 1
2
toward either one of the stable point attractors at zero or one. In the second
case, contrarian choices have reversed the flow directions making any initial
densities to flow toward 1
2
, now the unique and stable point attractor.
where C ik ≡ k!(k−i)!i! . The instrumental parameter in determining the flow
direction and the associate phase transition is the eigenvalue at the point
attractor pc =
1
2
. It is given by,
λ = (1− 2a)
[
1
2
]k−1 k∑
i= k+1
2
(2i− k)C ik. (10)
The range λ > 1 determines an unstable point attractor with an ordered
phase characterized by the existence of a majority-minority splitting. At
contrast, λ < 1 makes the point attractor stable. The case λ = 1 determines
the critical value of the contrarian choice density ac at which the phase
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transition occurs. From Eq. (10), we get,
ac =
1
2

1−

(1
2
)k−1
k∑
i= k+1
2
(2i− k)C ik


−1
 . (11)
In the case k = 3 we recover the above result a = 1
6
≃ 0.17. We find ac = 0.33
at k = 5 and 0.30 at k = 9 with the limit ac → 12 , k → +∞.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a simple model to study the effect of contrarian choices
on opinion forming. At low densities a the opinion dynamics leads to a
mixed phase with a clear cut majority-minority splitting. However, beyond
some critical density ac, contrarians make all the attractors to merge at the
separator pc =
1
2
. It becomes the unique attractor of the opinion dynamics.
When a > ac vote intentions flow deterministically with time towards
an exact equality between A and B opinions. In this new disordered stable
phase no majority appears. Agents keep shifting opinions but no symmetry
breaking (i.e., the appearance of a majority) takes place. There an election
would result in effect in a random winner due to statistical fluctuations. The
value of ac depends on the size distribution of update groups.
Accordingly, our results shed a totally new light on recent elections in
America (2000) and Germany (2002). It suggests those “hung elections”
were not chance driven. On the opposite, they are a deterministic outcome
of contrarians. As a consequence, since contrarian thinking is becoming a
growing trend of modern societies, the subsequent “hanging chad elections”
syndrome was predicted to become both inevitable and of a common occur-
rence in our earlier work [4].
In the mean time our prediction has been fulfilled twice with the 2005
Schro˝der-Merkel German elections and the 2006 Prodi-Berlusconi Italian
elections. Even the 2005 Bush-Kerry American presidential elections, which
is at odd with above cases (Bush got a 2.5% margin with Kerry), is part of
the same frame. It indeed demonstrates the effect of applying an external
pressure to reinitialize the respective proportions of support for A and B. Up
to few days ahead of the vote, the polls were showing a definite move toward
a hung vote and it is the Bin Laden videotape, released the Friday preceding
the election, which has shifted the election vote. Accordingly to our frame,
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we claim that would the elections have taken place two weeks latter, the
Bush-Kerry race would have yield another hung election as in 2000.
Clearly our model opens new and exciting paths to the modeling of opin-
ion forming. Nevertheless it is also a crude simplification of the complicated
reality of social phenomena and we should keep in mind that it is only a
model, which does not claim to be an exact description of the very reality.
Many new features could be incorporated to enrich it in social features like
recently making the density of contrarian to depend on the total densities of
agents supporting each coalition [19].
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